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September 24, 2009
Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Re:

State v. Hurt, 20080662-CA
Utah R. App. P. 24Q)

Dear Ms. Collins:
In preparing for oral argument in this case, counsel discovered that the Ninth Circuit
recently issued the following case: United States v. Gonzalez,
F.3d
, 2009 WL
2581738,09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10,840. In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit held that the search
of Gonzalez's vehicle, conducted under the then-prevailing interpretation of New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), but rendered unconstitutional by Arizona v. Gant,
U.S. ,
129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), could not be upheld under the good faith exception to the warrant
requirement. Gonzalez thus conflicts with the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v.
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009), which the State cited to the Court in a previous
letter.
Oral argument is set for Monday, 28 September 2009.
Sincerely,

ARIAN DECKER
ssistant Attorney General

copy: Dana M. Facemyer

Westlaw.
2009 WL 2581738
— F.3d — , 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10,840
(Publication page references are not available for this document.)

H
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ricardo GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 07-30098.
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Failure to apply a newly declared constitutional
rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.
Rebecca L. Pennell, Federal Defenders of Eastern
Washington and Idaho, Yakima, WA, for the defendant-appellant.

Aug. 24, 2009.

James A. McDevitt, United States Attorney, and
Thomas J. Hanlon (argued), Assistant United States
Attorney, Yakima, WA, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Washington, Edward F. Shea, J., of possession of
firearm and ammunition by prohibited person.

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court.
D.C.NO.CR-06-02112-EFS.

Holding: Following remand, 129 S.Ct. 2156, the
Court of Appeals,
Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that search of defendant's vehicle, conducted under then-prevailing interpretation of Supreme Court ruling in New York v.
Belton, but rendered unconstitutional by subsequent
Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Gant, was not
in good faith.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Courts € ^ 1 0 0 ( 1 )
106kl00(l) Most Cited Cases
[1] Criminal Law €^>394.4(3)
110k394.4(3) Most Cited Cases
Search of defendant's vehicle, conducted under
then-prevailing interpretation of Supreme Court ruling in New York v. Bel ton as permitting warrantless
vehicle search incident to arrest of occupant of the
vehicle, but rendered unconstitutional by subsequent Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Gant,
which read Belton more narrowly and was announced while defendant's conviction was on direct
review, was not in good faith, and exclusionary rule
thus applied. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[2] Courts €^>100(1)
106kl00(l) Most Cited Cases

Before BETTY B. FLETCHER, RICHARD A.
PAEZ and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
We review this appeal for the second time on remand from the United States Supreme Court. The
Court on May 4, 2009 granted certiorari, and vacated and remanded our disposition for further consideration in light of its recent decision in Arizona
v. Gant, — U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d
485 (2009). We hold that Gant requires that Appellant Ricardo Gonzalez's motion to suppress be granted and, therefore, Gonzalez's conviction be reversed.
Gonzalez had previously been convicted of Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Prohibited
Person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Gonzalez's conviction resulted from a firearm
found during a June 19, 2006 traffic stop of a car in
which Gonzalez was riding. The police, following
the arrest of another passenger for out-standing
warrants, searched the passenger compartment of
the car and discovered a loaded 9 millimeter Beretta firearm inside the glovebox. Gonzalez filed a
motion to suppress, asserting the search of the car
violated his Fourth Amendment rights, which the
district court denied. Following his conviction on
November 28, 2006, Gonzalez appealed his conviction and sentence, asserting in part that the denial
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2009 WL 2581738
... p.3d — , 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10,840
(Publication page references are not available for this
of his motion to suppress was in error. We affirmed
the district court on all aspects of the appeal.
United States v. Gonzalez, 290 Fed.Appx. 51 (9th
Cir.2008). Our ruling affirming denial of the motion to suppress rested on the Supreme Court's
holding in New York v. Bel ton, 453 U.S. 454, 460,
101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), which has
been read by our court as permitting a warrantless
vehicle search incident to the arrest of an occupant
of the vehicle. Gonzalez, 290 Fed.Appx. at 52; see
United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th
Cir.2006) ("Applying the Belton rule, we have held
that a warrantless automobile search will be valid if
it is 'roughly contemporaneous with the arrest.'").
[1] In Gant, the Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's holding that the broad reading of
Belton by our and other courts was error. Reading
Belton more narrowly, the Court announced as the
rule for vehicle searches incident to arrest: "Police
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search or it is reasonable to believe
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a
search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that
another exception lo the warrant requirement
applies." Gant, 129 S.Ct at 1723-24. The Government concedes that, under the Supreme Court's current reading of Belton stated in Gant, the search of
Gonzalez's vehicle was improper because Gonzalez
was handcuffed and secured in a patrol vehicle at
the time of the search of the vehicle. However, the
Government asserts nonetheless that the search was
in good faith under the then-prevailing interpretation of Belton and that, therefore, the exclusionary
rule should not be applied.
The Government's assertion is not directly supported by our current case law. The Government relies
on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Herring
v. United States, --- U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 695, 172
L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), which applied the good faith
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tment)
exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), in holding
that whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment "turns on the culpability of the police and the
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct." Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 698. Neither the Supreme Court nor our court, however, has applied
the good faith exception to the scenario we face: a
search conducted under a then-prevailing interpretation of a Supreme Court ruling, but rendered unconstitutional by a subsequent Supreme Court ruling announced while the defendant's conviction was
on direct review. The cases the Government relies
on involve application of the good faith exception
to searches conducted in reliance on a warrant held
invalid following the search; see, e.g., Herring 129
S.Ct. at 698; or a statute or regulation subsequently
found unconstitutional during direct review of the
defendant's conviction; see, e.g., Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364
(1987); United States v. Peltier, All U.S. 531, 95
S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975); United States v.
Meek, 366 F.3d 705 (9th Cir.2004).
We conclude, however, that this case should be
controlled by long-standing precedent governing
the applicability of a new rule announced by the
Supreme Court while a case is on direct review.
The Court has held that "a decision of this Court
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied
retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered." United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562, 102 S.Ct.
2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d
649 (1987) (finding that even decisions constituting
a "clear break" with past precedent have retroactive
application). This precedent requires us to apply
Gant to the current case without the overlay of an
application of the good faith exception. To hold
that Gant may not be fully applied here, as the
Government urges, would conflict with the Court's
retroactivity precedents.
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[2] Such a ruling would undermine the rationale of
Johnson and Griffith. As stated in Griffith, "failure
to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to
criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication." 479 U.S.
at 314, 107 S.Ct. 708. It would violate "the integrity
of judicial review" by turning the court into, in effect, a legislative body announcing new rules but
not applying them, rather than acting in our proper
role as an adjudicative body deciding cases. It also
would "violate[ ] the principle of treating similarly
situated defendants the same" by allowing only one
defendant to be the beneficiary of a newly announced rule. Id. at 322-23, 107 S.Ct. 708. In Gant,
the Supreme Court upheld in full the decision of the
Arizona Supreme Court, which not only found the
search at issue unconstitutional, but ordered the
suppression of the evidence found as a result of the
unconstitutional search. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at
1724; State v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640, 646
(2007). Hence, refusal to allow Gonzalez similarly
to benefit from the Court's ruling in Gant through
application of the exclusionary rule would implicate the same concerns mandating the Court's holding in Griffith. [FN1]
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document.)
light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gant See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,
900 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that "a threejudge panel of this court and district courts
should consider themselves bound by the
intervening higher authority and reject the
prior opinion of this court as having been
effectively overruled").
— F.3d — , 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10,840
END OF DOCUMENT

Because both Johnson and Griffith remain binding
precedent, we cannot apply the good faith exception here without creating an untenable tension
within existing Supreme Court law. We, therefore,
hold that evidence derived from the search at issue
must be suppressed and reverse Gonzalez's conviction. [FN2]
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FN1. We are concerned here with the
Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant.
We do not consider whether the police officers are entitled to qualified immunity in
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action.
FN2. To the extent that our opinion conflicts with our previous holding in United
States v. Osife, 398 F.3d 1143 (9th
Cir.2005), we decline to follow Osife in
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